

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-A-219

23 May 1979

AGENDA

Two Hundred and Twenty Second Meeting
Wednesday, June 6, 1979, 1000 Hours
Room 9A135, NSA Headquarters Building
Ft. Meade, Maryland


1000 Hours	Address by Director, NSA
1030 Hours	Technical Security Threats
1200 Hours	Lunch - NSA Cafeteria (Optional)
1330 Hours	Laboratory Demonstration (Optional)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-529

23 May 1979

OS REGISTRY
***FILE** *Committees 14*
Also: Records 5
Also: Security 2

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members
FROM: 
Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: Microforms

STATINTL

1. The Chairman has approved the approach outlined in SECOM D-521 dated 16 May 1979 on this same subject and has asked that the entire package be sent to you for your review.

2. The Chairman specifically desires your comments on the proposed avenue of attack to the general problem and would appreciate any further comments you might have on this subject. Please provide a response on this matter to the Committee Staff by 15 June 1979.



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Attachment

OS REGISTRY

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

*FILE *Committees 14*
Also: Records 5
SECOM-D-521
Also: Security 2

16 MAY 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee


STATINTL FROM:


Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Security of Microforms

REFERENCE: Memorandum from C/IHC to C/SECOM
dated 5 April 1979

STATINTL

1.  Chairman, Information Handling Committee wrote you on 5 April 1979 informing of the results of his committees review of security procedures and practices involving microforms. He relays recommendations of his working group which bear on the Security Committee. The Security Committee is asked to:

a. Develop security recommendations and guidance for specific application to the microform environment.

b. Investigate further security problems regarding destruction, accountability and control procedures of microforms.

2. The Chairman, IHC proposes that the two Committees work jointly to review in detail procedures outlined in various security documents to clarify requirements which are meant to apply to microform as well as paper documents and through this effort arrive at guidance on control of microform.

3. This appears to the staff as an effort of unnecessary scope. It would seem reasonable to have the Security Committee adopt the position that the underlying problem of controlling sensitive material is not unique to microforms although there may be unique aspects in application of some procedures.

4. People working with microforms have recognized and confronted the unique problems. These could be referred to the Security Committee for resolution.

5. The advantages of such an alternative course of action are:

a. it would allow concentration on priority problems and would, over time, permit a compilation of security procedures specifically applicable to microform material;

b. it would negate the need for review of all document control procedures;

c. it should result in controls no more stringent than those required of other sophisticated data handling systems; and

d. it would permit attention to resource costs in connection with specific security proposals.

6. In connection with the IHC request that the Security Committee investigate further the problems regarding destruction and control procedures, the staff has learned that some efforts are underway at the present time to enhance security of documents in microform.

a. CIA has developed a prototype device that will securely destroy 3 to 4 pounds of microform material per hour. Contract for three preproduction models is scheduled. The device should be available by the end of the year.

b. Toward resolution of problems with numbering microform copies of controlled documents, CIA has solicited from the US Census Bureau a price quotation

and estimate of development time for a sequential numbering to be used for placing unique control numbers on diazo duplicate microfiche. There is no response as of 16 May 1979 from the Census Bureau.

7. It would be consistent with the Security Committee charter to have the Research and Development Subcommittee look at these issues and make recommendations to the Security Committee.

8. The problems associated with security of microforms do not appear to lend themselves to rapid and easy solutions. Continued attention to the overall issue and particular address to specific problems is a viable approach. The proposals made here implement that concept and are submitted for your consideration.

9. If you endorse this approach then it is proposed that members be informed by copy of this memorandum and their opinions solicited. Further, the staff has drafted a response to the Chairman, Information Handling Committee and suggest that it be provided to members for their approval prior to release. The tasking of the R&D Subcommittee should await receipt of member comments.

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DRAFT #1

OS REGISTRY

***FILE** *Committee 14*
Also: Records 5
also: Security 2

STATINTL MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, DCI Intelligence Information
Handling Committee

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Chairman

SUBJECT: Memo from C/IHC 5 April 1979
(IHC/MM 79-08) to C/SECOM
Same Subject

1. The Security Committee has reviewed your request to:
 - a. develop security recommendations and guidance for specific application to the microform environment and
 - b. investigate further the security problems regarding destruction, accountability and control procedures of microform material.
2. The problems you identified do not lend themselves to ready and easy solutions but merit all due consideration. The Security Committee will be pleased to continue cooperative efforts toward viable and feasible resolutions.
3. The Security Committee holds that the underlying problem of controlling sensitive material is not unique to microforms. Although there may be unique aspects in application, the standard control requirements for paper documents are applicable to microform copies.

4. Your proposal that the two Committees work jointly to review in detail all procedures outlined in various security documents to see which apply to microform material was carefully considered. The Security Committee offers an alternative approach premised on the belief that people working with microforms have recognized if not already confronted unique problems in application of security procedures for document control. The Security Committee would be pleased to address such specific issues and offer possible resolution.

5. The advantages of such an alternative course of action appear to be more goal related. Thus the alternative:

- would negate the need to review all document control procedure;
- would allow concentration on priority issues and would, over time, result in a compilation of security procedures specifically applicable to microform material and no more stringent than those required of other data handling systems; and
- would permit attention to resource costs in connection with specific security proposals.

6. In connection with your proposal to investigate further the problems regarding destruction and control procedures, the issues will be directed to the Research and Development Subcommittee with a request for comments and recommendations.

7. To maintain relationship on this matter, I
STATINTL appoint [REDACTED] of the Community Security
Group, Room 3E05, Hqs., extension [REDACTED] as my point of
contact. STATIN

Robert W. Gambino (DRAFT)

Distribution:

Orig - Return C/CSG for retype
1 - C/SECOM

OS REGISTRY

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Information Handling Committee

*FILE

Committees 14
Also Records 5
Also Signatures 2

IHC/MM 79-08
5 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

STATINTL FROM:

Chairman, DCI Intelligence Information
Handling Committee

SUBJECT: Security Review of Handling of Microforms
within the Intelligence Community

REFERENCE: Memo from Chairman, DCI/IHC dtd 12 June 1978,
same subject

1. In accordance with the reference memo, the Intelligence Community agencies (CIA, DIA, NSA, Air Force, Army, Navy, and State) completed phase one of a detailed review by internal agency staffs of currently practiced security procedures and practices involving microforms. The review was to determine to what extent the handling of microforms of intelligence documents met the requirements of Executive Order 12065, related implementation directives, and the NSC directive governing classification, declassification, downgrading, and safeguarding of national security information.

2. The reviews dealt with the nature of the medium and the security aspects involved in the transmission, storage, reproduction, utilization and destruction of microforms. The findings of the reviews within the various agencies were nearly in total agreement. The following are the most serious of the problems for which the working group found no ready solutions:

a. It was unanimously agreed that the basic security problem of microforms stems from their small size and high degree of data compaction. The accidental removal or surreptitious use of microform documents is and must continue to be a concern to all. While this fundamental issue should be confronted by the Security Committee, it should be noted that the underlying problem is not unique to microforms and any proposed controls should be no more stringent than those required of other sophisticated data handling systems.

03-9-0950

b. Routine destruction of microforms was also cited as a problem. The only certain method of destruction for all types of film is burning. This is effective for small quantities; but since the film bases have a very high kindling point, destruction requires a fire that is fueled by a substance other than the film. Thus, large quantities are difficult to handle. A concomitant problem is the large volume of toxic smoke produced by the film itself. Certain chemicals are effective for destroying images on some types of film but the working group found that there is no single chemical commercially available which is capable of destroying images on all types of microfilm (i.e., silver halide, diazo, or vesicular). Similarly, pulverizers suitable for destroying paper documents are not considered effective for destruction of microforms, especially those which have been reduced more than 100 times standard print size.

c. Nearly all agencies reported difficulty in complying with accounting procedures for microfiche copies of controlled documents requiring copy numbers. The use of copy numbers on microfiche copies of controlled documents involves technical problems, especially in a high volume production operation. In spite of an extensive review of commercially available systems, no agency knows of a device suitable for this application.

3. Other problems include:

a. Ambiguities which exist in current regulations with respect to procedures for handling documents. For example, paragraph 4-404 of Executive Order 12065 states "paper copies . . . of TS documents are subject to copy number and distribution controls." No mention is made of microfilm versions of paper documents, although it is assumed that they are expected to be subject to the same kind of security controls as paper documents.

b. Handling procedures that are either technically infeasible or extremely costly when applied to microforms. For example, the requirement to re-mark a document to reflect new downgrading, declassification, and upgrading instructions. To accomplish this would require re-marking the original document, re-filming it, distributing it to the original addressees with instructions to destroy the outdated copy along with its reproductions.

4. As a result of the security problems which are inherent in the handling of microforms, and the lack of known means of dealing with them, the working group recommends that:

a. The physical security problem cited in subparagraph 2(a), which concerns the problem of small size and high degree of data compaction involved in microforms, be considered by the Security Committee as a matter of priority to develop recommendations for specific application to the microform environment.

b. The Security Committee investigate further the security problems cited in subparagraphs 2(b) and (c) regarding the destruction of microforms and accountability and control procedures using contractor assistance as necessary.

c. The Security Committee and the IHC work jointly to review procedures outlined in the various security documents in detail to clarify requirements which are meant to apply to microforms as well as paper documents, as described in subparagraphs 3(a) and (b) of this memorandum. Where procedures are determined to apply to microforms as well as paper documents, the two Committees should in each case provide guidance as to how those requirements should be met.

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OS REGISTRY
*FILE Committees 14
Also: Records 5
Also: Security 2

April 23, 1979

Census Bureau
Suitland, Maryland

Attention Mr. Robert Varson

Dear Bob,

The purpose of this letter is to solicit from the Census Bureau a price quotation and estimated development time for a sequential numbering device to be used for placing unique control numbers on diazo duplicate microfiche. The specifications for the device are listed below.

The sequential control number is to be placed on the diazo duplicate microfiche as they are produced on the duplicator. The control number will consist of a five digit alpha numeric number (ex. 0001A) and would be placed in the top right hand corner of the microfiche title (examples attached). The number will be placed on source document microfiche in an NMA format (98 page) and Computer Output Microfiche (COM) in 24X (63 and 98 page) and 48X (270 and 420 page) formats. The number should be eye readable but be no larger than 15 millimeters wide and 5 millimeters high.

The numbering device must have the capability to return to its original start position (0001A) after each master microfiche is duplicated. The duplicator operator should have the option to manually select the alpha character (A-Z) for each production run he is to make. The actual printing and sequencing of the number should be accomplished with a minimum of operator intervention. Possible methods for placing the number on the microfiche include: 1) ink jet printing; 2) a pre exposure device using either light emitting diodes or a stenciled disk with a light source; or 3) a perforation device. Any method that is used must provide a permanent number on the microfiche.

The numbering device would be used primarily on Bruning OP series microfiche diazo duplicators. However, it would be advantageous if the device could be used on any of the high speed microfiche duplicators currently on the market.

Any questions pertaining to this request may be directed
STATINT to me on [REDACTED]

Yours truly,
[REDACTED]

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Attachments as stated

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100040016-5






Fig. 1.
Microfiche Format.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

FIGURE 3. Microfiche 63 Frame (7 Rows X 9 Columns) 24:1



1. Effective Reduction 24:1.
2. Dimensions in millimeters.
3. Grid lines shown do not appear on microfiche.
4. With the notch and corner cut in the positions shown on this drawing the sensitized side is facing the observer.




The text area shown represents the data placed on a 355.6mm x 279.4mm (14 x 11 in) page (typically 64 lines of 132 characters).


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Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100040016-5

FIGURE 4. Microfiche 98 Frame (7 Rows X 14 Columns) 24:1



1. Effective Reduction 24:1
2. Dimensions in millimeters.
3. Grid lines shown do not appear on microfiche.
4. With the notch and corner cut in the positions shown on this drawing the sensitized side is facing the observer.





The text area shown represents the data placed on a 215.9mm x 279.4mm (8.5 x 11 in) page (typically 64 lines of 80 characters).

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Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100040016-5

FIGURE 5. Microfiche 270 Frame (15 Rows X 18 Columns) 48:1



Effective Reduction 48:1.


Dimensions in millimeters.

Grid lines shown do not appear on microfiche.


With the notch and corner cut in the positions shown on this drawing the sensitized side is facing the observer.

The text area shown represents the data placed on a 355.6mm x 279.4mm (14 x 11 in) page (typically 64 lines of 132 characters).

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1. Effective Reduction 48:1.
2. Dimensions in millimeters.
3. Grid lines shown do not appear on microfiche.
4. With the notch and corner cut in the positions shown on this drawing the sensitized side is facing the observer.



The text area shown represents the data placed on a 215.9mm x 279.4mm (8.5 x 11 in) page (typically 64 lines of 80 characters).

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

OS REGISTRY
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FILE

Committee 14

Also: Security 2
Also: Records 5

DATE: June 14, 1979

TO : Mr. Robert W. Gambino
Chairman, DCI Security Committee

Executive Secretary

STATINTL

FROM : David Ryan
Security Officer, Federal Bureau of Investigation

VIA LIAISON

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF MICROFORMS

Reference memorandum, SECOM-D-529, of [redacted]
Executive Secretary, SECOM, to SECOM members dated May 23, 1979.

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The FBI does not maintain microform copies of intelligence documents. All intelligence documents handled by this Bureau are maintained in hard-copy form in accordance with standard security policy.

During our examination of various alternatives to the hard-copy manual filing system, we have developed an appreciation of potential security pitfalls which are amplified with the application of micrographic technologies. Association of our representatives with various working groups connected with the Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IIHC) has provided us with guidelines and standards which will prove helpful as we implement the use of Micrographics. In this regard, the Micrographics Working Group of the IIHC has recently published standards for microfiche copies throughout the Intelligence Community.

It is our observation that perhaps there are security problems unique to microforms. It would be helpful to us as we venture into this technology to have the benefit of community standards for security of micrographics comparable to the standards recently published by the IIHC for microfiche copies. Accordingly, it may be more appropriate to address these issues of microform security head-on, rather than in retrospect as proposed.



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